My own infrastructure · ~40 clients
Authorized internal security audit of a diskless game-club network
A read-only audit of a diskless game-club network I own, written up as a versioned report with a prioritized vulnerability table and a remediation plan for skeptical staff.
- Security
- Networking
- Audit
01 Problem
I own a small diskless game-club network and wanted a real picture of its security posture before presenting a remediation plan to skeptical staff.
02 Scope
Owner-authorized internal audit of my own infrastructure, read-only throughout: port scanning, banner grabbing, and share/service enumeration only, with no exploitation and no changes to the live boot images.
03 Approach
Ran subnet discovery and full port scans from a client machine, then service fingerprinting, and worked the findings into a prioritized, versioned report.
I documented the reboot-to-restore CCBoot architecture, mapped every remote-management channel exposed to the client segment, and wrote a remediation plan with an owner-facing narrative.
04 Stack
- CCBoot 2026.01.06 (Youngzsoft diskless stack)
- MikroTik RouterOS
- Windows targets
- PowerShell TCP scanners
- nmap
- Markdown reporting
05 Result
Delivered as reports v2 through v4 with a prioritized vulnerability table, an attack-chain narrative, and a remediation plan separating proven findings from unproven ones.
06 What broke, and what fixed it
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No client isolation
A flat network — 13 live hosts reachable directly from a single client.
-
TightVNC everywhere
Exposed on every client in the segment.
-
Management planes exposed
MikroTik WinBox and managed-switch Telnet/HTTP panels reachable from the client segment.
-
End-of-life database
An unsupported SQL Server 2005 instance still running.
-
Unauthenticated PXE
The diskless boot chain had no authentication.